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With the continuous advance of China's fiscal decentralization, local 
governments are no longer administrative organizations of longitudinal dependence, 
and increasingly become economic organizations of independent interests and 
resource allocation authority. The local governments need an amount of revenue to 
support their public spending, however their funds are difficult to meet the need of 
expenditure because of the asymmetric responsibility and financial power. To 
maximize their regional interests, local governments will necessarily participate in the 
competition for economic and tax resources. Thus, the regional and intergovernmental 
tax competition comes into being and is exacerbated by the existing evaluation 
mechanism. On the one hand, tax competition is conducive to attracting investment; 
on the other hand, non-standard competition would result in lack of public spending 
and even low economic efficiency. Therefore, research on tax competition and its 
economic effects are very important.  
Most early literature on domestic tax competition focused on qualitative analysis 
and didn’t give a full explanation for the intensity of competition, how to select 
competitors, effects of tax competition on economic growth and other series of key 
issues. Thus, this paper does an empirical analysis on the tax reaction function among 
Chinese provincial governments, using the panel data from 1997 to 2009, to analyze 
the tax competition strategy, and to make comparison among different regions. On this 
basis we do a further study on the relationship between tax competition and economic 
growth, trying to explore both positive and negative effects of tax competition. And 
how to regulate tax competition, play its positive role in economic development, will 
be the ultimate goal of this paper. 
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